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STATEMENT

by H.E. Ambassador Anatoly Antonov

**Head of Delegation of the Russian Federation
at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Vienna, April 30, 2007

Mr. Chairman,

This first Preparatory Committee session opens one more Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) operation review cycle. At this milestone we think first and foremost, of the future. Yet, at the same time, it is an occasion to look back and assess what we managed to do and what issues are still to be resolved.

Despite all the complications, the Treaty does operate. It is in demand. The decades of joint work to reinforce the non-proliferation regime prove its value. NPT remains at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It has successfully served the task of minimizing risk of nuclear conflict. No matter how complicated the situation is, no one doubts that we need and can find ways to respond to the challenges and threats to the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. With 189 member States the Treaty has become the most universal one.

There are much more States that have renounced the nuclear option after signing the NPT, than those that have pursued it. The recent years have seen a drastic reduction of nuclear arms. Russia and the US continue their cooperation in dismantlement of nuclear weapons and materials remaining after the cold war, and securing their protection.

At the same time, as we all know, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is going through hard times. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is in a deadlock. There are no representatives of DPRK in this hall. The goal of making NPT completely universal remains unattained. The issues of regional non-proliferation are not resolved. There are still black market proliferation networks. We are concerned about proliferation of sensitive technologies that might be used for the production of nuclear weapons. Existing disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms sometimes fail to promptly and efficiently respond to new challenges to international security — the nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism.

In this context, the situation when erosion of the non-proliferation regime may become irreversible must not be allowed. We strongly believe that no State,

whatever powerful and influential it is, can solve the task of preserving and strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime, moreover, relying on force. The negative developments can only be prevented by joint efforts using political and diplomatic means and proven mechanisms of the United Nations, first and foremost, its Security Council.

Mr. Chairman,

To our mind, the main objective of this Preparatory Committee session is to elaborate recommendations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. These recommendations should contribute to the NPT objectives and promote strengthening of the Treaty. This can only be possible based on comprehensive approach, taking in consideration all the three Treaty's pillars — non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. What can be done for progress in this area?

First, we suggest working together on nuclear energy development patterns allowing for steady nuclear fuel supplies programmes based on international cooperation as an alternative to proliferation of sensitive technologies. We recall the words of Mohamed El Baradei, IAEA Director General who said that today there is no reason to build new facilities for uranium enrichment or processing irradiated fuel.

We believe that a possible way to resolve this issue is to implement the initiative on developing cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear energy, proposed by V.V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation in 2006. Its main element is establishment of multilateral centers for supplying nuclear fuel cycle services. The first step is to establish international uranium enrichment center safeguarded by IAEA in Russia. The participants in the Center will have guaranteed access to the enrichment services they need, enabling them not to develop their own production.

There are other proposals, in particular, the US initiative on Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, proposal on guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies, made by six States-suppliers of services in this field. Certainly, one should look at other initiatives, too. The task is to select their most valuable elements in order to

prevent sensitive technologies replication, and at the same time, ensure compliance with NPT provisions on unimpeded access of the NPT member States to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. We are prepared to continue the work to specify and make compatible, if possible, all such proposals.

Second, we find it important to improve efficiency of IAEA verification activity. We believe that the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement is an effective instrument for improving the Agency's verification capabilities. It opens up new opportunities of "penetrating" verification in order to prevent and eliminate different non-proliferation concerns for the Agency. We believe that in the future the Additional Protocol should become a universally accepted norm to verify the NPT member States' implementation of their non-proliferation obligations, and a new significant standard of nuclear export.

We call upon all States which have yet to bring the Additional Protocols into force, primarily those who carry out significant nuclear activities or have significant nuclear stockpiles, to do this as soon as possible.

The Russian Federation have provided and will provide assistance towards strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, including through financing the national program for scientific and technical support of the Agencies safeguards activities.

We respect the interest of States in developing peaceful nuclear technologies. For many years our country has cooperated with many countries in this field. We assist the NPT States in building accelerators and neutron generators; we also supply neutron radiography units, gamma-ray treatment equipment, and many more. We participate in the relevant IAEA programmes.

Thirdly, it is important to pursue efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. I would like to reiterate that the Russian Federation strictly abides by its obligations under the Treaty. In the recent years we have consistently reduced our nuclear weapons. In 2001, Russia fulfilled its obligations completely and ahead of the START, and continues steadily reducing strategic delivery means and the related warheads.

To date, Russia has eliminated its non-strategic nuclear weapons by three quarters against the arsenals handed down to us by the USSR.

In total, in comparison with 1991, the total amount of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been reduced more than fivefold.

We are fulfilling obligations under the Russian-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions which provides for reduction of the number of strategic nuclear weapons down to 1700-2000 by each side before December 31, 2012.

As the START Treaty expires in December 2009, the work to elaborate a new arrangement with the US in the strategic field has commenced. Here, in addition to our obligations under the NPT, we are guided by the Joint Declaration of the Presidents of Russia and the United States which was signed upon conclusion of the Moscow Treaty and which states the intention of the two nations to reduce their strategic offensive potential to the minimal possible levels corresponding to their national security and ally obligations as well as reflecting the new nature of relations between Russia and the US in the strategic sphere.

We would like to draw attention to the obvious link between the strategic offensive and defensive arms. The Global Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense could provoke other States into building up their own missile armaments and thus propel their spread throughout the world, as well as affect the process of actual nuclear disarmament. Placing weapons in space, including anti-missile ones, could become a key factor triggering a new spiral in the arms race.

Mr. Chairman,

Russia steadily pursues strengthening and universalization of the NPT. It is essential to jointly seek ways of engaging countries that remain outside the Treaty's legal field to participate in it, particularly, through expanding the IAEA verification activity in their territories and strengthening their national legislations in the field of accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear material, as well as export control measures.

Mr. Chairman,

We regard the nuclear test ban as a measure contributing to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is important to continue efforts towards laying ground for the entry into force of the CTBT. September 2006 marked ten years since this Treaty was open for signing but due to well-known reasons it still has not joined the ranks of agreements in effect. Observing the moratorium on nuclear testing is a significant measure but it can not substitute legal obligations arising from the CTBT. This issue calls for predictability. Therefore we urge all states whose accession to the CTBT will bring it into force to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

It is high time for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to start negotiations on elaboration of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). We reaffirm our support for this idea. The sooner the deadlock situation at the CD is broken and the programme of work is agreed, the earlier it could undertake negotiating the FMCT.

Furthermore, we should reflect on what we could do together to strengthen security assurances provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States. We raise no objection to working out a global agreement on providing non-nuclear-weapon States with security assurances that would exclude use or threat of use of nuclear weapons taking into account cases stipulated in defense doctrines of the nuclear weapon States when such weapon could be used. Russia is ready to embark on such work.

Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) is an effective measure of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security. Russian initiative proposing to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of the nuclear weapon States remains highly relevant. Its implementation would result in maximal expansion of geographical scope of areas completely free of nuclear weapons.

We welcome the signing of the Treaty on Establishing NWFZ in Central Asia by five Central Asian States and call upon all nuclear States to support this Treaty.

We are committed to provisions of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference. Russia, being a member of the “quartet” of international mediators involved in the Middle East settlement, is consistently supporting the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in this region.

Mr. Chairman,

We would like to commend the painstaking professional work carried out by the IAEA with regard to “violations”, “non-compliance” and “technical deficiencies” that have been revealed in the nuclear activities of a number of states and arouse concern among us. It is crucial that these processes are evolving within the Agency without undermining Treaty’s credibility but rather building on inviolability of its norms instead.

Mr. Chairman,

The situation around Iran’s nuclear programme remains tense. We expect Iran’s positive response to the IAEA and UN Security Council’s appeals with regard to the steps that Teheran should take to clarify the outstanding questions related to its past nuclear activities and to restore confidence in its current nuclear efforts. In so doing, we still deem it necessary for Teheran to solve all issues through cooperation with the IAEA and by negotiation, as it was explicitly reaffirmed in the statement by the six Foreign Ministers made following the adoption of UNSCR 1747. We believe that this is the only possible way to resolve the situation around Iran’s nuclear programme.

There are currently realistic prospects of negotiated solution to the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem. We support the arrangements reached at the six-party talks on February 13 this year and expect all parties to implement them timely and accurately.

Mr. Chairman,

It would be wise to pay special attention in our work to such problems, as the Treaty non-compliance, "black" market phenomenon and possibility of nuclear material falling into hands of terrorists. Without solving these issues, it would be impossible to ensure security of each and every state and of the international community in general.

New challenges call for new solutions. We appreciate the wide support offered to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism announced by the Presidents of the United States and Russia at the G8 Summit in Saint Petersburg. This Initiative is open for accession by any State which shares its common goals and is strongly committed to combating nuclear terrorism. Its main objective is to mobilize States to implement their obligations under the recently adopted International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, UNSCR 1540 and other international instruments related to combating nuclear terrorism.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to assure you that the Russian delegation looks forward to constructive work and is willing to cooperate with all delegations with a view to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the entire international nuclear non-proliferation regime.